This paper studies multiagent distributed estimation under sensor attacks. Individual agents make sensor measurements of an unknown parameter belonging to a compact set, and, at every time step, a fraction of the agents' sensor measurements may fall under attack and take arbitrary values. We present the saturated innovation update (SIU) algorithm for distributed estimation resilient to sensor attacks. Under the iterative SIU algorithm, if less than one half of the agent sensors fall under attack, then, all of the agents' estimates converge at a polynomial rate (with respect to the number of iterations) to the true parameter. The resilience of SIU to sensor attacks does not depend on the topology of the interagent communication network, as long as it remains connected. We demonstrate the performance of SIU with numerical examples.
B. Summary of Contributions
This paper presents the SIU algorithm, an iterative, consen-sus+innovations algorithm for resilient distributed parameter estimation. We consider a multiagent setup, where each agent makes streams of measurements (over time) of a parameter θ * , and, at each time step an attacker manipulates a subset of the measurements. Each agent maintains a local estimate of θ * and updates its estimate using a weighted combination of its neighbors' estimates (consensus) and its sensor measurement (innovation).
During each time step (iteration), each agent applies a time-varying scalar gain to its own innovation term to ensure that the 2 norm of the scaled innovation term is below a given threshold. The SIU algorithm only requires agents to have local knowledge of the network topology (i.e., agents only need to know their neighbors and not the entire network topology) and achieves the same level of resilience as the most resilient centralized estimator. As long as less than half of the agents' sensors are under attack at any time step, then, all agents recover θ * correctly.
The SIU algorithm offers two main advantages over existing techniques for resilient distributed computation under Byzantine attacks [10] - [15] . First, unlike the algorithms presented in [14] and [15] , the SIU algorithm only depends on agents having local knowledge and do not require agents to know the entire network. Second, under the SIU algorithms, the number of tolerable attacks at each time step scales linearly with the total number of agents regardless of the network topology, as long as the network is connected. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other algorithm, aside from SIU, for distributed parameter estimation under sensor attack whose resilience does not depend on network topology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review technical background and specify our sensing, communication, and attack models in Section II. In Section III, we present the SIU algorithm. We state and prove our main results in Sections IV and V, respectively. Under SIU, the agents' local estimates converge at a polynomial rate to θ * when less than 1 2 of the agents' sensors are under attack. We provide numerical examples of the SIU algorithm in Section VI, and we conclude in Section VII.
Notation: Let R k be the k dimensional Euclidean space, I k the k by k identity matrix, and 1 k and 0 k the column vectors of ones and zeros in R k , respectively. The operator · 2 is the 2 norm when applied to vectors and the induced 2 norm when applied to matrices.
Let G = (V, E) be a simple, undirected graph, where V = {1, . . . , N } is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. The neighborhood Ω n of a vertex n is the set of vertices that share an edge with n. Let d n = |Ω n | be the degree of a vertex, and the degree matrix of G is D = diag (d 1 , . . . , d N ). The adjacency matrix of G, A = [A n l ], where A n l = 1 if (n, l) ∈ E and A n l = 0, otherwise, describes the structure of G. Let L = D − A be the graph Laplacian of G. The eigenvalues of L can be ordered as 0 = λ 1 (L) ≤ · · · ≤ λ N (L), and 1 N is the eigenvector associated with λ 1 (L). For a connected graph G, λ 2 (L) > 0. Chung [18] and Bollobás [19] provided a detailed description of spectral graph theory.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Sensing and Communication Model
Consider a network of N agents {1, 2, . . . , N } connected through a time-invariant interagent communication network G = (V, E) (i.e., the topology of G does not change over time). The vertex set V = {1, 2, . . . , N } is the set of agents, and the edge set E represents the interagent communication links. The agents' goal is to collectively estimate an unknown (nonrandom), static parameter θ * ∈ R M (i.e., θ * does not change over time). In the absence of an attacker, each agent n makes a measurement y n (t) of the parameter θ * y n (t) = θ * (1) where t is the (discrete) time index. Let x n (t) be the estimate of θ * by agent n at time t. The agents' goal is to ensure that
for all agents n = 1, . . . , N . Sensing model (1) implies that, in the absence of an attacker, each agent is locally observable. That is, in the absence of an attacker, each agent, n, can exactly determine θ * from y n (t). In the presence of an attacker, however, estimating θ * becomes a nontrivial task. We make the following assumptions regarding the sensing and network model. Assumption 1: The graph G is connected. Assumption 1 can be made without loss of generality, since, if G were not connected, we can separately consider each connected component of G. The focus of this paper is resilient distributed estimation with respect to sensor data attacks, so, for simplicity and clarity, we assume that the interagent communication is noiseless.
Assumption 2: The 2 norm of θ * is bounded by a finite value η. That is, the parameter θ * belongs to a set Θ, defined as
Each agent a priori knows the value of η.
Boundedness is a natural assumption, since in many practical settings for distributed estimation, we estimate parameters from physical processes (e.g., power grid state estimation [20] and wireless sensor networks for environmental monitoring [2] ). 2 The values of such parameters are bounded by laws of physics.
B. Attacker Model
An attacker aims to disrupt the estimation procedure and prevent the agents from achieving their goal (2) . The attacker may arbitrarily manipulate the sensor measurements of some of the agents. We model the measurement of a sensor under attack as y n (t) = θ * + a n (t)
where a n (t) is the disturbance induced by the attacker. In practice, an attacker does not directly design the additive disturbance a n (t). Instead, the attacker replaces the agents' measurement with any arbitrary y n (t), which can be modeled, following (4), by a corresponding a n (t).
The attacker may know the true value of the parameter θ * and uses this information to determine how to manipulate sensor measurements and inflict maximum damage. 3 In our attacker model (4), the adversary directly manipulates the sensor measurements of a subset of the agents. Since the adversary directly manipulates the measurements, model (4) is a type of spoofing attack [9] , [21] , [22] . This model is related to man-in-the-middle attacks, where the adversary manipulates communications between the agents and sensors or manipulates data after processing (e.g., quantization) [21] , [22] . Let the set A t denote the set of agents whose sensors are under attack at time t, i.e.,
Let N t = V \ A t denote the agents whose sensors are not under attack at time t. In the presence of an attacker, agents can no longer achieve (2) by setting x n (t) = y n (t).
We make the following assumptions on the attacker. Assumption 3: For some 0 ≤ S < N, |A t | ≤ S, for all t. Assumption 4: The attack does not change the value of θ * . The agents do not know the set A t . Assumption 3 is similar to the sparse sensor attack assumption found in the cyber-physical security literature [23] - [25] . We will compare the resilience of the SIU algorithm to the resilience of any centralized estimation algorithm. Applying Theorem 3.2 from [25] , a necessary and sufficient condition for any centralized estimator to resiliently recover θ * is that the number of attacked sensors is less than half of all sensors, i.e., |A t | N < 1 2 . Assumption 4 states that the attacker does not change the value of the parameter of interest. The attacker may only manipulate the measurements y n (t) of a subset of the agents.
The attacker model (4) differs from the Byzantine attacker model [5] . A Byzantine attacker is able to hijack a subset of the agents and control all aspects of their behavior (i.e., a Byzantine attacker can arbitrarily manipulate the message generation and estimate generation processes of hijacked agents). Equation (4) models a simpler attack than the Byzantine model, but it is still a realistic model. Due to resource limitations (e.g., time, computation power, etc., we refer the reader to [26] for a detailed description relating attacker resources to attacker capabilities), the attacker directly manipulates sensor measurements but does not completely hijack individual agents.
III. SIU ALGORITHM
The SIU algorithm is a consensus+innovations [1]- [4] algorithm for resilient distributed estimation. In SIU, every agent maintains and updates a local estimate x n (t). In contrast with [1]- [4] , which assumes that there is no attacker, the SIU algorithm addresses distributed estimation when a subset of the agents' sensors are under attack. Each iteration of SIU consists of two steps: message passing and estimate update. To initialize, each agent n sets its local estimate x n (0) = 0.
Message Passing: In each iteration, every agent n transmits its current estimate x n (t) to each of its neighbors. Each agent n transmits d n messages in each iteration.
Estimate Update: Each agent n ∈ V updates its estimate as
where α t > 0, β t > 0 are sequences of parameters to be specified in the sequel. The term K n (t) is a time-varying gain on the local innovation and is defined as
where γ t is a parameter to be specified in the sequel. The gain K n (t) ensures that the 2 norm of the term K n (t) (y n (t) − x n (t)) is upper bounded by γ t for all n ∈ V and for all t. The challenge in designing the SIU algorithm is selecting the adaptive threshold, γ t , which represents how much sensor measurements are allowed to deviate from the local estimates. If γ t is too small, then, the gain K n (t) will limit the impact of uncompromised sensors (n ∈ N t ), and the agents will not recover θ * . On the other hand, if γ t is too large, then, the attacker will be able to mislead the agents with measurements the deviate more from the local estimates. The key is to choose γ t to balance these two effects.
We adopt the following parameter selection procedure. 1) Select resilience index 0 < s < 1 2 . 2) Select the sequence α t and β t to be of the form
where γ 1 ,t and γ 2 ,t follow
for κ 1 = 1 + √ N and κ 2 = 2 √ N with initial conditions γ 1 , 0 = 0 and γ 2 , 0 = η. Recall, from (3), that η is the upper bound on θ * 2 . The resilience index s determines the maximum tolerable fraction of attacked sensors, and, for the SIU algorithm, we require s < 1 2 . The resilience index is a design parameter in SIU; choosing a larger s improves the resilience of SIU but slows the convergence of estimates to the true parameter.
The gains K n (t) are state dependent (i.e., they depend on the estimates x n (t)) and nonsmooth (as functions of the state), which makes the analysis of SIU nontrivial and quite different from traditional con-sensus+innovations procedures [1] - [4] that rely on the smoothness of the gains to obtain appropriate Lyapunov conditions for convergence analysis. The analysis with nonsmooth gains as in (7) require new technical machinery that we develop in this paper.
IV. MAIN RESULT
We now present our main result, which addresses the resilience and performance of the SIU algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Resilience of Algorithm SIU): Let α t , β t , and γ t be given by (8) , (9) , and (10), and let s ∈ 0, 1 2 be the resilience index. Under the SIU algorithm, if |A t | N < s for all times t, then, we have
for every agent n and for all 0 ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 − τ 2 . Theorem 1 states that, under SIU, all of the agents' estimates converge to θ * at a rate of 1 t τ 0 , for any 0 ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 − τ 2 , so long as less than half of the agents' sensors fall under attack, irrespective of how the attacker manipulates the sensor measurements. Recall that any centralized estimator, which collects sensor measurements from all of the nodes at once, is only resilient to attacks on less than half of the sensors. The SIU algorithm ensures that all of the agents' recover the value θ * even though it does not explicitly identify those agents who are under attack. The SIU algorithm achieves, in a fully distributed setting, the same resilience as the most resilient centralized estimator, regardless of the topology of the interagent communication network (so long as it is connected).
Under the SIU algorithm, the message generation and estimate update for each agent only depends on the agent's local knowledge. Existing algorithms for resilient distributed consensus [14] and resilient distributed function calculation [15] require each agent to have knowledge of the entire structure of the communication network. When there are many agents in the network, algorithms requiring global network knowledge become expensive from both memory and computation perspectives.
In addition, existing work on distributed algorithms resilient to Byzantine attackers shows that, in general, the resilience of an algorithm (i.e., the number of tolerable Byzantine agents) depends on the structure of the network [10]- [15] . Under our attack model (4), the number of tolerable attacks for SIU algorithms scales linearly with the number of agents, regardless of the (connected) network topology. When the resilience of algorithms depends on network structure (e.g., [10] - [15] ), the number of tolerable attacks does not necessarily increase as the number of agents grows. In comparison, for any connected structure, SIU ensures resilient estimation if less half of the agents' sensors are under attack.
V. ANALYSIS OF SIU: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to analyze convergence properties of time-varying linear systems of the form
with nonzero initial conditions v 0 , w 0 = 0 where r 1 (t) and r 2 (t) follow
with δ 1 > δ 2 and c 3 , . . . , c 7 > 0. Specifically, we require the following lemma, the proof of which may be found in the appendix. Lemma 1: The system in (12) satisfies
We now prove Theorem 1.
Proof (Theorem 1):
We analyze the behavior of the agents' average estimate. Define the stacked estimate x t = x 1 (t) T · · · x N (t) T T , the stacked measurements y t = y 1 (t) T · · · y N (t) T T , and the network average estimate
Step 1: We determine the dynamics of x t and x t . From (6), we have that x t follows the dynamics
Define y t , the difference between the local estimates and the average estimate, as y t = x t − 1 N ⊗ x t , and e t , the average error, as e t = x t − θ * . Furthermore, define the matrix P N M as (20), we have that y t follows
Following [3] , for 0 < β t ≤ 1 λ N (L ) , the eigenvalues of the matrix I N M − β t L ⊗ I M − P N M are 0 and 1 − β t λ n (L) for n = 2, . . . , N , each repeated M times.
For n ∈ N t , we have y t − x t = y t + 1 N ⊗ e t . Then, (22) becomes
The process e t evolves as
Step 2: From (23) and (24), we find upper bounds on y t 2 and e t 2 . Let V t = y t 2 , and let W t = e t 2 . In order to compute V t and W t , we require the following facts:
Equation (25) follows directly from the definition of P N M . Inequality (26) follows from the fact that 0 < K n (t) ≤ 1. Inequality (27) follows from
Computing the 2 norm of both sides of (23) and (24) , and using the fact that, K n (t) (y n (t) − x n (t)) 2 ≤ γ t = γ 1 ,t + γ 2 ,t for any n ∈ A t , we have
Step 3: We now use induction to show that, if |A t | N < s for all t ≥ 0, then, V t ≤ γ 1 ,t and W t ≤ γ 2 ,t for all t ≥ 0. In the base case, we consider t = 0, and we have x n (0) = 0 for all n. Thus, we have x 0 = 0. For all n ∈ V , x n (0) − x 0 2 = 0, which means that y t 2 = 0 = γ 1 , 0 . Moreover, since x 0 = 0, we have e t 2 = θ * 2 ≤ η = γ 2 , 0 .
Step 4: In the induction step, we assume that V t ≤ γ 1 ,t and W t ≤ γ 2 ,t , and we show that V t + 1 ≤ γ 1 ,t+ 1 and W t + 1 ≤ γ 2 ,t+ 1 . Substituting the induction hypotheses into (29) and (30), we have
where, recall, κ 1 = 1 + √ N . To derive (31), we have used the fact that 2 √ N ≥ |A t | + |N t |. To derive (32), we have used the fact that
Inequality (32) states that W t + 1 depends on the term trace
which, by definition of K n (t), depends on y n (t) − x n (t) 2 . Note that, by definition of N t , we have y n (t) = θ * for all n ∈ N t . Applying the triangle inequality and the induction hypotheses, we have
Inequality (34) implies that K n (t) = 1 for all n ∈ N t , which means that trace(
which yields the relation W t + 1 ≤ γ 2 ,t . The relation V t + 1 ≤ γ 1 ,t follows directly from (31).
Step 5: We now study the behavior of γ 1 ,t and γ 2 ,t . So long as 0 < s < 1 2 , system (10) , which describes the dynamics of γ 1 ,t and γ 2 ,t , falls under the purview of Lemma 1. 4 Thus, we have lim t →∞ (t + 1) τ 0 γ i,t = 0 (36) i = 1, 2, for all 0 ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 − τ 2 . Combining (36) with (34) yields the desired result: for every agent n and for all 0
As a consequence of Theorem 1, if |A t | N < s < 1 2 for all t, then, for all n ∈ V and for all 0 ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 − τ 2 , there exists finite R n > 0 such that x n (t) − θ * 2 < R n (t + 1) τ 0 . The rate τ 0 depends only on the choice of τ 1 and τ 2 , but the constant R n depends on the behavior of γ 1 ,t and γ 2 ,t . The behavior of γ 2 ,t depends on the resilience index s -the term (1 − α t (1 − 2s) ) increases as s increases, which means that the constant R n increases as well. Thus, in the SIU algorithm, there is a tradeoff between resilience and convergence of estimates to the true parameter.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In our numerical simulations, we consider the random geometric network of N = 300 agents given by Fig. 1 . Each agent observes a parameter θ * ∈ R 3 with bounded energy θ * 2 ≤ η = 100. The agents represent, for example, a team of robots tracking a target. The parameter θ * is the target's location, expressed in its x, y, and z coordinates. We consider attacks on S 1 = 60 and S 2 = 120 agents, respectively, and we choose corresponding resilience indices of s 1 = 0.201 and s 2 = 0.401. In each simulation, we run SIU for t = 500 000 iterations. We choose the following parameters: a = 1.54 × 10 −4 , b = 3.78 × 10 −2 , τ 1 = 0.15, τ 2 = 0.001. We examine the algorithm's performance with both fixed and timevarying attack sets, which are chosen uniformly at random. The adversary changes the measurement of each agent under attack (n ∈ A t ) to y n (t) = −θ * . The resilience of SIU does not depend on the adversary's strategy. Fig. 2 shows that, for both fixed and time varying attack sets, and for both attacks on S 1 = 60 and S 2 = 120 agents, the SIU algorithm ensures that all of the agents' local estimates converge to θ * .
The estimates converge more quickly when the resilience index is lower and there are fewer agents under attack (i.e., S 1 = 60). In general, there is a tradeoff between resilience and the rate at which the local estimates converge to the parameter of interest.
Recall, from the proof of Theorem 1, that the threshold γ t is an upper bound on the 2 norm of the local estimation error, x n (t) − θ * 2 . We demonstrate the tradeoff between the algorithm's resilience index and the error bound γ t . Fig. 3 shows that, as we increase the resilience index s, the error bound γ t (after t = 500 000 iterations) also increases. According to Theorem 1, the SIU algorithm ensures that the local estimates converge to θ * eventually as long as less than sN agents are under attack. In practice however, we may not be able to run an arbitrarily large number of iterations of SIU, so we are interested in the error performance after a finite number of iterations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the SIU algorithm, a consensus+innovations iterative distributed algorithm for resilient parameter estimation under sensor attacks. Under SIU for any (connected) network topology, local estimates of all agents converge polynomially to the parameter of interest if less than half of the agents' sensors are under attack. The number of tolerable attacks scales linearly with the number of agents, irrespective of the (connected) network topology. The SIU algorithm achieves the same level of resilience in a fully distributed setting as the most resilient centralized estimator. We demonstrated the performance of the SIU algorithms with numerical examples, and we showed that there exists a tradeoff between resilience and error performance. Future work will study resilient distributed estimation with more complicated sensing and communication models, e.g., communication networks with failing links, measurement noise, and time-varying dynamic parameters.
APPENDIX
A. Intermediate Results
The proof of Lemma 1 requires several intermediate results.
The following results, from [1] and [3] , study the convergence of scalar time-varying linear systems of the form
with r 1 (t), r 2 (t) of the form
where c 1 , c 2 > 0 and 0 < δ 2 ≤ δ 1 < 1. Lemma 2 (Lemma 25 in [3] ): Let r 1 (t) and r 2 (t) follow (39). If δ 1 = δ 2 , then there exists B > 0, such that, for sufficiently large nonnegative integers, j < t, we have
where the constant B can be chosen independently of t, j. If δ 2 < δ 1 , then, for arbitrary fixed j, we have
As a consequence of Lemma 2, for the system given by (38), if δ 1 = δ 2 , then, |v t | remains bounded. If δ 1 > δ 2 , then v t converges to 0.
The following result characterizes the rate of convergence of v t [given by (38)] when δ 1 > δ 2 .
Lemma 3 (Lemma 5 in [1] ): Consider the system in (38) with δ 2 < δ 1 . Then, we have lim t →∞
for all 0 ≤ δ 0 < δ 1 − δ 2 and for all initial conditions v 0 . We present the following modification of Lemma 3. Lemma 4: Consider the scalar time-varying linear system
where r 1 (t), r 2 (t) satisfy (39), δ 1 > δ 2 , and c 3 , c 4 , c 5 > 0. The system in (43) satisfies lim t →∞ (t + 1) δ 0 v t = 0 (44) for all 0 ≤ δ 0 < δ 1 − δ 2 and for all initial conditions v 0 . Proof: Consider the expression c 3 r 2 (t) − c 4 r 1 (t). Since δ 1 > δ 2 , for any 0 < < δ 1 − δ 2 , there exists T 0 , such that, for all t ≥ T 0 , we have c 3 r 2 (t) − c 4 r 1 (t) ≥ (t + 1) −(δ 2 + ) . Moreover, since r 2 (t) decreases in t and c 4 r 1 (t) ≥ 0, there exists T 1 such that, for all t ≥ T 1 , we have c 3 r 2 (t) − c 4 r 1 (t) ≤ 1. Let T = max (T 0 , T 1 ). Thus, for all t ≥ T , we have
which means that, for all t ≥ T , we have
Let w T = |v T |, and, for t ≥ T , define the time-varying linear system w t + 1 = 1 − (t + 1) −(δ 2 + ) w t + c 5 r 1 (t).
As a consequence of (45), we have |v t | ≤ w t for all t ≥ T . The system in (47) falls under the purview of Lemma 3, which yields (44). We now consider the system defined in (12) v t + 1 = (1 − c 3 r 1 (t)) v t + c 4 r 1 (t)w t w t + 1 = (1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 6 r 1 (t)) w t + c 7 r 1 (t)v t
The following lemma shows that v t and w t remain bounded. Lemma 5: The system in (12) satisfies
Proof.
Step 1: We first show that sup t ≥0 |w t | < ∞. Since r 1 (t) and r 2 (t) decrease in t, and, since δ 1 > δ 2 , there exists (finite) T 0 ≥ 0 such that, for all t > T 0 0 ≤ 1 − c 3 r 1 (t) ≤ 1 (50) 0 ≤ 1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 6 r 1 (t) ≤ 1.
For all t ≥ T 0 , we can express v t as v t = t −1
which means that, as a consequence of (40)
for some constant c 8 > 0.
Step 2: From (12), we have |w t + 1 | ≤ (1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 6 r 1 (t)) |w t | + c 7 r 1 (t) |v t | (54) ≤ (1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 9 r 1 (t)) sup l ∈[T 0 ,t] |w l | + c 10 r 1 (t) (55)
where c 9 = c 6 + c 7 and c 10 = c 7 |v T 0 |. Define the system m t + 1 = max (m t , (1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 9 r 1 (t)) m t + c 10 r 1 (t)) (56)
for t ≥ T 0 with initial condition m T 0 = |w T 0 |. By definition, we have m t ≥ sup l ∈[T 0 ,t] |w l |. Define the system m t + 1 = (1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 9 r 1 (t)) m t + c 10 r 1 (t)
for t ≥ T 0 with initial condition m T 0 = m T 0 = |w T 0 |. Note that m T 0 ≥ 0 and that, since t > T 0 , 1 − c 5 r 2 (t) + c 9 r 1 (t) ≥ 0, m t nonnegative for all t ≥ T 0 . Further, note that system (57) falls under the purview of Lemma 4, so we have lim t →∞ m t = 0.
Step 3: Since m t is a nonnegative sequence that converges to 0, there exists a time T 1 ≥ T 0 such that m T 1 + 1 ≤ m T 1 . Consider the smallest such choice of T 1 ≥ T 0 . By definition of T 1 , we have m T 0 < m T 0 + 1 < . . . < m T 1 . Then, from (56), we have m t = m t for all t ∈ [T 0 , T 1 ]. Thus, we have m t ≤ m T 1 for all t ∈ [T 0 , T 1 ]. Further, by definition of T 1 and m t , we have m T 1 + 1 = m T 1 . We now show that m t = m T 1 for all t ≥ T 1 .
Define, for t ≥ T 1
